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Abstract
Recently, the international legality of the EU’s economic activity in unlawfully acquired territories
has gained much salience. Claims are increasingly heard that the duty of non-recognition requires
the inapplicability of trade agreements to unlawfully acquired territories. In this light, this article
attempts a survey of the relevant EU practice by focusing on the case-studies of Palestine and Western
Sahara. The main question examined here is whether the EU has acted in breach of its obligation of
non-recognition by concluding agreements with third States that extend to unlawfully acquired territories.
Overall, this article argues that there is a growing gap between EU identity rhetoric as a promoter of
international law and its actual practice on the ground.
Keywords: unlawful territorial situations; duty of non-recognition; the right to self-determination;
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1. Introduction
The EU’s identity as a global actor is firmly anchored in a distinct normative and political agenda.
As well as an economic power, the Union has consistently portrayed itself as a virtuous, normative power
committed to the strict observance and development of international law, both internally and externally.1
The Treaty of Lisbon further solidified the image of the EU not only as a ‘power in trade’, but also
as a ‘power through trade’.2 ‘Power through trade’ refers to the shift to the use of trade as a foreign
policy instrument; the Union’s external action is geared towards using its economic clout to externalise
fundamental non-trade values and objectives, including respect for international law.3
However, the unlawfulness of some territorial situations may call into question the legality and
legitimacy of entertaining economic relations with the parties responsible for the conduct that brought
about such situations. Trade relations with parties involved in unlawful territorial situations indirectly call
into question respect for fundamental rules of the international legal order, such as respect for the right to
self-determination. As will be explained below, under certain circumstances the duty of non-recognition of
unlawful territorial situations under general international law limits or even prohibits economic relations
with States responsible for these situations.
Recently, the international legality of the EU’s economic activity in unlawfully acquired territories
has gained much salience. Claims are increasingly heard that the duty of non-recognition requires the
inapplicability of trade agreements to unlawfully acquired territories.4 In this light, the present article
attempts a survey of the relevant EU practice by focusing on the case-studies of Palestine and Western
Sahara. The main question examined here is whether the EU has acted in breach of its obligation of
non-recognition by concluding agreements with third States that extend to unlawfully acquired territories.
Overall, this article argues that there is a growing gap between EU identity rhetoric as a promoter of
international law and its actual practice on the ground.
The survey of the relevant EU practice is complemented by an analysis of the approach of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to questions of interpretation of the territorial scope of trade
agreements extending to unlawfully acquired territories to further identify the EU’s overall approach to
occupied territories. Respect for international law is now expressly a core constitutional norm – something
that has been acknowledged by the Court itself.5 The EU’s external projection of itself as an entity firmly
committed to the strict observance and development of international law generates the expectation that its
courts also espouse something of this internationalist approach.6 Thus, the way in which the EU courts
have treated in their practice the duty of non-recognition is highly relevant in this context. In this light,
the following sections will also examine the Court’s reliance on international law, and in particular on
the duty of non-recognition, in cases involving trade agreements covering unlawfully acquired territories.
It will be argued that the Court’s tendency to largely ignore the broader international legal framework of
the dispute, including the duty of non-recognition, in this line of case-law does not sit well with the image
1See Treaty on the European Union (TEU), art 3(5). See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
art 21(1); E Cannizzaro, ‘The Neo-Monism of the European Legal Order’ in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and R Wessel (eds),
International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 35, 56–7.
2See generally J Larik, ‘Good Global Governance through Trade: Constitutional Moorings’ in J Wouters, A Marx,
D Geraets and B Natens (eds), Global Governance Through Trade: EU Policies and Approaches (Edward Elgar 2016) 43–69
(emphasis added).
3A Marx, B Natens, D Geraets and J Wouters, ‘Global Governance through Trade: An Introduction’ in Wouters, Marx,
Geraets and Natens (n 2) 1, 4.
4See e.g. ‘“Made in Illegality” – STOP All Economic Relations with Illegal Israeli Settlements’ (European Co-Ordination
of Committees and Associations for Palestine, 28 February 2014) <http://www.eccpalestine.org/made-in-illegality-stop-all-
economic-relations-with-illegal-israeli-settlements/> accessed 31 January 2018. See also ‘Report: Label and Liability: How the
EU Turns a Blind Eye to Falsely Stamped Agricultural Products Made by Morocco in Occupied Western Sahara’ (Western Sahara
Resource Watch/EMMAUS Stockholm, 18 June 2012) < https://docplayer.net/15119744-Label-and-liability-report-how-the-eu-
turns-a-blind-eye-to-falsely-stamped-agricultural-products-made-by-morocco-in-occupied-western-sahara.html> accessed
24 January 2019.
5Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association for America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change EU:C:2011:864,
para 101 and Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and Others v Kadi EU:C:2013:518, para 103.
6G De Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013)
20 Maastricht JECL 168, 183.
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of a court that shares an internationalist outlook – thereby undermining the image of the EU as an entity
with a particular fidelity to international law.
2. Unlawful territorial situations and the duty of non-recognition
From the outset, a few general remarks regarding the duty of non-recognition under general
international law need to be made in order to provide some context to the discussion of the CJEU’s
practice. It needs to be noted that when it comes to questions of territorial status (including title to
territory; modes of acquisition of territory; and means of modification of territorial status) international
law does not reduce itself to merely recording the facts on the ground. In this sense, it is the existence of
substantive principles of legality, rather than the factual exercise of effective control over territory, that
affects and determines the lawfulness of territorial situations.7 As Judge Kreca observed:
Effectiveness in a system with a defined concept of legality may be legally accepted only in
cases in which it does not conflict with the norms that serve as criteria for legality. Within the
coordinates of the de jure order effectiveness versus legality is an incorrect approach, because to
accept effectiveness as a rule ‘would be to apply a hatchet to the very roots of the law of nations
and to cover with its spurious authority an infinite series of international wrongs and disregard for
international obligations’.8
This section discusses the unlawfulness of territorial situations arising from the breach of the
obligation to respect the right to self-determination – a right that, as will be explained below, applies
both to the Palestinian people and to the Sahrawi people. Although, for present purposes, the analysis is
confined to this principle, it is worthwhile noting that a number of other principles and norms (including
the uti possidetis principle, the principle of territorial integrity, as well as the prohibition of systematic
racial discrimination including the prohibition of apartheid) may be relevant in assessing the lawfulness of
a given territorial situation.9
The right to self-determination is a core tenet of international law; it is clearly accepted and widely
recognised as a peremptory norm of international law.10 By virtue of this principle, peoples are to ‘freely
determine their political status’ and to ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.11
The right to self-determination creates a concomitant obligation on States regarding the method by which
decisions concerning peoples should be made, that is by taking into account their freely expressed will.12
The illegality of changes of territorial status when these are based on the denial, and thus the violation, of
the right to self-determination finds widespread support in practice. In 1966 the UN General Assembly
declared that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of its mandate
in South West Africa (Namibia) through, inter alia, the forcible denial of the right to self-determination, and
terminated South Africa’s mandate on that basis.13 The illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia
was confirmed by the Security Council, which then decided to request of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia.14 The Court opined that South Africa’s failure to submit itself to supervision by the UN and
7See generally S Zappala, ‘Can Legality Trump Effectiveness in Today’s International Law?’ in A Cassese (ed), Realizing
Utopia: The Future of International Law (OUP 2012) 105ff; E Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law:
Reconciling Effectiveness, Legality and Legitimacy (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 8.
8Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kreca in Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [1996] ICJ Rep 658, 709 (emphasis in the original).
9Milano (n 7) 101–29; D Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 89–167; J Dugard,
Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius Publications Limited 1987) 154–70.
10ILC, ‘Commentary to Art. 26 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With
Commentaries’ (adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session) (2001) II Yrbk of the ILC 85, para 5.
11International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999
UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), art 1.
12A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 62; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, paras 58–9.
13UNGA Res 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, UN Doc A/RES/2145 (XXI).
14UNSC Res 264 of 20 March 1969, UN Doc S/RES/264; UNSC Res 269 of 12 August 1969, UN Doc S/RES/269; UNSC
Res 276 of 30 January 1970, UN Doc S/RES/276.
The EU’s duty of non-recognition and the territorial scope of trade agreements covering unlawfully
acquired territories 3
its disrespect for the right to self-determination amounted to a breach of the mandatory agreement.15
That breach enabled the UN General Assembly to unilaterally revoke the mandate, thus terminating South
Africa’s right to govern the territory.16 Another instance where the denial of the right to self-determination
affected the legality of a territorial situation was Southern Rhodesia.17 A few days before the unilateral
declaration of independence by the Smith racist regime was issued, the UN General Assembly adopted a
resolution appealing to all States ‘not to recognize any government in Southern Rhodesia which is not
representative of the majority of the people’.18 The day after the declaration of independence, the Security
Council adopted a resolution calling upon all States ‘not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime’.19
In Resolution 277 (1970), the Security Council toughened its stance by calling upon all Member States
to take all appropriate measures ‘to ensure that any act performed by officials and institutions of the
illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia shall not be accorded any recognition, official or otherwise, including
judicial notice, by the competent organs of their State’.20 In a similar fashion, the General Assembly
urged all States ‘to refrain from any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal
regime’.21 According to Milano, this practice shows that ‘the right to self-determination impacts upon the
legality of any claim and/or implementation of effective Statehood which does not take into account a
genuine expression of popular will, but is openly discriminatory towards the majority of the population’.22
As expressly affirmed by the ICJ in its relevant Advisory Opinions, the right to self-determination
applies both to the Palestinian people and to the Sahrawi people and, thus, these peoples are entitled to
freely determine their own future political status.23 According to the ICJ, the annexation of land severely
impedes the exercise of the right to self-determination and constitutes, therefore, a breach of the obligation
to respect that right.24 Thus, as long as Israel and Morocco maintain their annexation of the territories in
question (by means of settlements or otherwise),25 that annexation amounts to a breach of their obligation
to respect the right to self-determination.
The obligation of non-recognition spells out the consequences for third parties of this unlawful
conduct on the part of Israel and Morocco. According to Article 42(2) of the Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations, in cases of a serious breach of a jus cogens norm,
international organisations (such as the EU) have duties corresponding to those applying to States under
Article 41(2) of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.26
Thus, States and international organisations alike are under an obligation not to recognise as lawful a
situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law.
15Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 29–32.
16Ibid, 45–50.
17See generally, V Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff
1990) 423–86.
18UNGA Res 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, UN Doc A/RES/2022 (XX).
19UNSC Res 216 of 12 November 1965, UN Doc S/RES/216.
20UNSC Res 277 of 18 March 1970, UN Doc S/RES/277.
21UNGA Res 2946 (XXVII) of 7 December 1972, UN Doc A/RES/2946 (XXVII).
22Milano (n 7) 123.
23Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep
136, paras 155–6; Western Sahara (n 12) para 162.
24Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 23) paras 115–22.
25For Israel, see UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/67, para 16. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 23) para 121. For Morocco, see M Dawidowicz, ‘Trading Fish or Human Rights in
Western Sahara? Self-Determination, Non-Recognition and the EC-Morocco Fisheries Agreement’ in D French (ed), Statehood
and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (CUP 2013) 250, 260; UN Human Rights
Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, fifth periodic report submitted by Morocco’ (UN Doc CCPR/C/MAR/2004/5 of 11 May 2004) para 39; OHCHR,
‘Report of the OHCHR Mission to Western Sahara and the Refugee Camps in Tindauf 15/23 May 2006’ (8 September 2006) para
26 <http://www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.htm> accessed 24 January 2019.
26ILC, ‘Commentary to Art. 42 of the Draft articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries’
(adopted by the International Law Commission at its 63rd session) (2011) II Yrbk of the ILC 66, para 1.
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The principle that legal rights cannot derive from an illegal act (ex injuria jus non oritur) provides the
rationale underpinning the obligation of non-recognition.27 In the literature, non-recognition is considered
as a precondition for an international legal order to exist.28 According to Lauterpacht: ‘to admit that an
unlawful act, or its consequences or immediate manifestations, can become a source of legal rights for the
violator of the law is to introduce into the legal system a contradiction which can only be resolved by the
negation of its legal character’.29 The obligation serves as a mechanism to ensure that a fait accompli on
the ground resulting from an illegal act does not ‘crystallize over time into situations recognized by the
international legal order’.30 While it may be questioned whether customary international law knows of
a general duty of non-recognition of all situations created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm,31
there is settled practice with regard to the obligation of non-recognition of territorial situations created by
a breach of the right to self-determination.32 Articles 41 and 42 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of International Organizations, which mirror Articles 40 and 41 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, foresee an aggravated regime of responsibility, providing that
the duty of non-recognition arises in cases of a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law.
A serious breach of a peremptory norm is defined in Article 41 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of International Organizations as a ‘gross or systematic failure’ to fulfil an obligation arising under a jus
cogens norm. According to the International Law Commission (ILC) and to relevant practice, the denial
of the right to self-determination qualifies as a serious breach of a peremptory norm giving rise to the duty
of non-recognition.33
According to the ILC the obligation of non-recognition not only covers formal acts of recognition,
but also ‘prohibits acts which would imply such recognition’.34 In the Namibia case,35 the ICJ elaborated
on the scope and content of the obligation of non-recognition. The duty of non-recognition entails,
inter alia, that States are under an obligation to abstain: (a) from entering into treaty relations with the
non-recognised regime in respect of the unlawfully acquired territory; and (b) from entering into economic
and other forms of relationship concerning the unlawfully acquired territory which might entrench the
non-recognised regime’s authority over the territory.36
The ICJ reaffirmed the duty of non-recognition in its Wall Advisory Opinion.37 In resolution
ES-10/15 the UN General Assembly acknowledged the Opinion and called upon all Member States
‘to comply with their legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion’.38 This formulation is
important since it shows that States voting in favour of the resolution (including all EU Member States)
have themselves characterised the obligations set out in the Opinion as ‘legal obligations’. In the present
context, it is also important to note that the EU has expressly acknowledged that it is bound by the
27J Crawford, ‘Legal Opinion: Third Party Obligations with Respect to Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’
(TUC, 24 January 2012) para 46 <https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/tucfiles/LegalOpinionIsraeliSettlements.pdf> accessed
24 January 2019.
28M Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territorial (Presses Universitaires de France 1997) 157.
29H Lauterpacht, ‘Régles générales du droit de la paix’ (1937) 62 RdC 95, 291, as quoted in A Lagerwall, ‘The Non-recognition
of Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital: A Condition for International Law to Remain Valid?’ (2018) 50 QIL, Zoom-in 33, 34.
30M Dawidowicz, ‘The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation’ in J Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds),
The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 677, 678.
31Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (n 23) 219, paras 43–4.
32See the practice mentioned in S Talmon, ‘The Duty Not to “Recognize as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of
Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation without Real Substance?’ in C Tomuschat and J-M
Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Obligations (Martinus
Nijhoff 2005) 99, 103; Dawidowicz (n 30) 679–82.
33ILC, ‘Commentary to Art. 41 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries’ (adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session) (2001) II Yrbk of the ILC 115, para 8.
34Ibid, 114, para 5.
35Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (n 15) 16.
36Ibid, paras 122, 124.
37Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 23) para 159.
38UNGA Res ES-10/15 of 2 August 2004, UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/15, para 3 (emphasis added).
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international law duty of non-recognition in its 2013 Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities
working within Israeli settlements in Palestine for EU funding.39
Despite the fact that the duty of non-recognition is well entrenched both in theory and in practice,
the exact contours of the duty’s content remain unclear.40 As seen above, the Namibia opinion made it
clear that the ambit of the prohibition includes the conclusion of treaties extending to unlawfully acquired
territories since this would imply recognition of sovereignty over that territory. In international law
the capacity of States to enter into agreements that apply within their territory is ‘an attribute of State
sovereignty’.41 Thus, any claim by a non-recognised regime to treaty-making capacity in relation to
territory under its control needs to be construed as a legal claim to sovereignty – which third parties
are under an obligation not to recognise according to international law.42 In this sense, extending the
territorial scope of an agreement to an unlawfully acquired territory would certainly amount to a breach of
a third party’s (in casu the EU’s) obligation of non-recognition.
However, although this particular aspect of the duty of non-recognition is fairly uncontested, the
same does not hold true for others. As Crawford observes: ‘[W]hile some elements of the obligation
of non-recognition are clear, such as the prohibition on diplomatic relations and conclusion of treaties,
or invocation of treaties which recognise the unlawful regime as sovereign, beyond this, it is difficult to
delineate any operative content to the obligation.’43 In particular, it is open to question whether other
types of cooperation with an unlawful regime, including the importation of products from settlements,
would imply recognition of the unlawful regime’s authority over the territory – thereby amounting to
a violation of the duty of non-recognition.44 According to Moerenhout, the exportation of products
from a settlement represents a claim of the non-recognised regime on the unlawfully acquired territory
and, conversely, ‘the act of importation remains a legal act, which requires the stamp of approval from
the importing state, which holds a sovereign power over its trade policy’.45 Thus, according to this
line of argumentation, the importation of products into a third county’s territory may be considered as
implicit recognition of the unlawful regime’s claim over the territory.46 However, this view is far from
uncontroversial. Some scholars consider the importation of products from settlements as falling outside
the ambit of the duty of non-recognition altogether,47 whereas others see importation as falling within the
scope of the related but separate duty of not rendering aid or assistance in maintaining an illegal situation
created by a serious breach of a jus cogens norm.48
Given the uncertainty surrounding the types of conduct to which the duty of non-recognition may
attach, the article will focus exclusively on the question of the territorial scope of the agreements concluded
between the EU on the one hand and Israel and Morocco on the other – since, as seen above, the prohibition
of entering into an agreement with the occupant in respect of unlawfully acquired territory is generally
accepted as falling within the ambit of the duty of non-recognition.
39Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for
grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards [2013] OJ C 205/05, para 1.
40Talmon (n 32) 104.
41Case of the S.S. ‘Wimbledon’ (Britain et al. v Germany) PCIJ Series A No 1, 14, 25.
42Dawidowicz (n 25) 218.
43Crawford (n 27) para 51. A number of judges disagreed with the majority opinion in Namibia exactly on the point of the
precise content of the duty of non-recognition. For a detailed discussion see J Crawford, The Creation of States in International
Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2006) 165–7.
44C Ryngaert and R Fransen, ‘EU Extraterritorial Obligations with Respect to Trade with Occupied Territories: Reflections
After the Case of Front Polisario Before EU Courts’ (2018) 2 EWLR 1, 16.
45T Moerenhout, ‘The Consequence of the UN Resolution on Israeli Settlements for the EU: Stop Trade with Settlements’
(EJIL:Talk!, 4 April 2017) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/tommoerenhout/> accessed 24 January 2019.
46Ibid.
47See generally E Kontorovich, ‘Economic Dealings with Occupied Territories’ (2015) 53 Colum J Transnat’l L 584.
48ILC (n 33) para 12. F Dubuisson, ‘The International Obligations of the European Union and its Member States with
Regard to Economic Relations with the Israeli Settlements’ (Made in Illegality, February 2014) 41 <http://www.madeinillegality.
org/IMG/pdf/etude_def_ang.pdf> accessed 24 January 2019. Crawford takes a middle position arguing that economic and
commercial dealings between an unlawful regime and a third State ‘may be considered as either a breach of the obligation of
non-recognition . . . or they might be considered to amount to aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful
act, contrary to articles 16 and 41(2) of the ILC Draft articles’ Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 27)
para 84.
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For the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning as a final note that the Court in the Namibia case
introduced an element of flexibility in the doctrine of non-recognition, the so-called ‘Namibia exception’.49
According to the Court, while acts that are undertaken in pursuance of the illegal administration are to be
considered null and void since they purport to enhance unlawful territorial claims, minor administrative
acts, such as ‘the registration of births, deaths and marriages’ and acts of benefit to the local population,
are valid50 as they are considered ‘untainted by the illegality of the administration’.51 Whether particular
conduct is beneficial to the local population and as such falls outside the scope of application of the
obligation of non-recognition is difficult to answer in abstracto; as Crawford notes: ‘Ultimately, the
question of whether a particular act falls within the Namibia exception . . . is highly fact-dependent.’52
3. The territorial scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and the EU’s obligation of
non-recognition
The EU-Israel Association Agreement constitutes the legal basis for EU trade relations with Israel.
The core aim of the Agreement is to reinforce the free trade area between the EU and Israel.53 Goods
exported from Israel to the EU and vice versa benefit from preferential tariffs and customs duties.54
However, according to Article 7 of the Agreement, this preferential treatment applies only to products
‘originating in Israel’.
It is important to note that the territorial clause inserted in the Agreement fails to provide a definition
of the Agreement’s precise territorial scope; Article 83 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement merely
refers to the ‘territory of Israel’. Another relevant agreement is the EU-PLO Association Agreement,
which aims to promote the economic and social development of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and
to encourage regional cooperation with a view to consolidating peaceful coexistence and economic and
political stability.55 Article 73 of the EU-PLO Association Agreement states that it applies to the ‘territory
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’. It is noteworthy that the EU-PLO Agreement applies to the whole
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – although the PLO only has partial control of these territories.56
The ensuing lack of clarity has created serious problems in practice.57 According to Israel, goods
produced in the occupied Palestinian territory are produced in Israel’s customs territory and, thus, they
should be entitled to preferential treatment under the Association Agreement.58 In light of the EU’s duty
of non-recognition, the territorial scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement is of utmost importance.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was confronted with the question of the territorial scope of
the EU-Israel Association Agreement in the context of the Brita case. The case concerned the import to
Germany of goods from an Israeli company located in the West Bank.59 The German authorities withdrew
49E Milano, ‘The Doctrine(s) of Non-Recognition: Theoretical Underpinnings and Policy Implications in Dealing with De
Facto Regimes’ (Paper presented at the ESIL Research Forum, Budapest, 28–30 September 2007) 2 < https://esil-sedi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Agora-3-Milano.pdf> accessed 24 January 2019.
50Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (n 15) para 125.
51Crawford (n 43) 167. The European Court of Human Rights has further delineated the scope of the ‘Namibia exception’ in
its jurisprudence. See Loizidou v Turkey App No 15318/89 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996) para 45; Cyprus v Turkey App No
25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001) para 96; Demopoulos v Turkey App No 46113/99 (ECtHR, 1 March 2010) paras 93–129.
52Crawford (n 27) para 91.
53Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States,
of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part [2000] OJ L 147/3 (EU-Israel Association Agreement), art 6.
54Ibid, arts 9–20.
55Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one
part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, of the other part [1997] OJ L 187/3, art 1(2).
56C Hauswald, ‘Problems under the EC-Israel Association Agreement: The Export of Goods Produced in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip under the EC-Israel Association Agreement’ (2003) 14 EJIL 591, 595.
57Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-386/08 Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen [2010] ECR I-1289,
para 26.
58Ibid, para 32. See also G Harpaz, ‘The Dispute Over the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the
Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – The Limits of Power and the Limits of the Law’ (2004) 38 J
World Trade L 1049, 1051.
59Case C-386/08 (n 57) para 30.
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the benefit of preferential treatment on the ground that it could not be conclusively established that the
imported goods fell within the scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.60 Brita, the company that
imports the products in question, brought the issue before the German courts, which then submitted a
preliminary question to the ECJ.61
Despite an express invitation by the Advocate General to analyse the legal status of Israel’s presence
in the West Bank for the purpose of establishing the territorial scope of the Association Agreement,62 the
Court decided the matter solely with reference to the ‘politically-detached’ principle of pacta tertiis.63
The ECJ argued that the EU-PLO Association Agreement implicitly restricted the territorial scope of
the EU-Israel Association Agreement.64 According to the Court, construing the territorial clause of the
EU-Israel Agreement
as meaning that Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect of products originating from
the West Bank would be tantamount to imposing on the Palestinian customs authorities an obligation
to refrain from exercising the competence conferred upon them by virtue of the . . . provisions of the
EC-PLO Protocol. Such an interpretation, the effect of which would be to create an obligation for a
third party without its consent, would thus be contrary to the principle of general international law,
‘pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt’.65
The judgment clarified that the scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement does not extend to
the occupied Palestinian territories, thereby making it abundantly clear that the EU has not implicitly
recognised Israel’s treaty-making capacity over these territories. At the same time, the Court’s exclusive
reliance on the pacta tertiis rule is formalistic and, more importantly, difficult to reconcile with the
image of a court that shares an internationalist approach.66 The failure to take into account the broader
international legal framework of the dispute and, more importantly, the EU’s duty of non-recognition, in
interpreting the territorial scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement leaves much to be desired.67
In this light, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, by focusing exclusively on the pacta tertiis
rule, the Court sought to achieve conformity with EU law while avoiding being drawn into political
storms.68 However, this judicial strategy severely undermines the image of the EU as an internationally
engaged polity.
4. EU–Morocco trade relations
4.1. The territorial scope of the trade agreements concluded between the EU and Morocco and the
EU’s obligation of non-recognition
The EU is Morocco’s largest trading partner, accounting for 55.7 per cent of its trade in 2015, while
61 per cent of Morocco’s annual exports go to the EU.69 The EU-Morocco Association Agreement, which
came into force in 2000, is the legal basis governing the relations between the two parties and its principal
aim is to establish a free trade zone between the EU and Morocco.70 In this light, the Agreement provides
for reduced or no tariffs for certain products71 and for the gradual implementation of measures for the
60Ibid, para 33.
61Ibid, paras 35–6.
62Opinion of Advocate General Bot (n 57) paras 109–12.
63G Harpaz and E Rubinson, ‘The Interface between Trade, Law and Politics and the Erosion of Normative Power Europe:
Comment on Brita’ (2010) 35 E L Rev 551, 566.
64Case C-386/08 (n 57) paras 50–3.
65Ibid, para 52.
66Harpaz and Rubinson (n 63) 565–6.
67R Holdgaard and O Spiermann, ‘Case C-386/08 Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, Judgment of the Court of
Justice (Fourth Chamber) of 25 February 2010, nyr’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1667, 1680–2.
68Harpaz and Rubinson (n 63) 566.
69See European Commission, ‘Countries and Regions: Morocco’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/morocco/> accessed 24 January 2019.
70Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States,
of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part [2000] OJ L 70/2 (EU-Morocco Association Agreement) art 6.
71Ibid, arts 7–30.
Europe and the World: A law review 3-1 8
greater liberalisation of reciprocal trade in agricultural and fishery products.72 In 2008 Morocco became
the first country in the Southern Mediterranean region to be granted ‘advanced status’ – thereby marking
a new phase of privileged relations.73 Against this background, an Agreement concerning reciprocal
liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products
was concluded between the EU and Morocco in 2010 and came into force in 2012.74
Neither the Association Agreement, nor the Liberalisation Agreement clarify whether their territorial
scope extends to Western Sahara. The Liberalisation Agreement does not include a territorial clause,
while Article 94 of the Association Agreement merely refers to the ‘territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’.
However, both Agreements have been interpreted in practice as including Western Sahara. There is
much evidence to support this proposition. The Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office has paid
visits to Moroccan exporters located in Western Sahara to check compliance with EU health standards
under the Association Agreement.75 Furthermore, the Commission has included 140 Moroccan exporters
located in Western Sahara in the list of approved exporters under the Association Agreement.76 The then
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, expressly
confirmed that the Liberalisation Agreement allows Morocco to ‘register as geographical indications
products originating in Western Sahara’.77 Finally, in the context of the Front Polisario case, both the
Council and the Commission expressly acknowledged that the Liberalisation Agreement has been de
facto applied to the territory of Western Sahara.78 Thus, it is safe to assume that, under these Agreements,
‘Saharan territory was included sub silentio’.79
The question of Western Sahara gained considerable attention in the negotiations over the 2006
EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA)80 and the 2013 EU-Morocco Fisheries Protocol.81
In 2006 the EU and Morocco concluded an FPA allowing access for EU vessels to Morocco’s fisheries for
an initial period of four years.82 In exchange, the EU paid Morocco a financial contribution of 144.4 million
euros for the relevant period.83 The FPA’s reference to ‘waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction
of Morocco’84 has been widely interpreted as including the waters off the coast of Western Sahara.85
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the 2006 FPA replaced earlier fisheries agreements which
72Ibid, art 16.
73Council of the EU, Joint Statement: European Union-Morocco Summit (Press Release, 7 March 2010) 7220/10 (Presse
54) 6.
74Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco
concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products,
the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 of and their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing
an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of
the other part [2012] OJ L 241/4 (Liberalisation Agreement).
75Case T-512/12 Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) v Council of the
European Union [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, paras 79, 99, 103.
76Ibid, paras 80, 99, 103. See also European Commission, ‘Morocco: Live bivalve molluscs’ (13 February 2017) <https://
webgate.ec.europa.eu/sanco/traces/output/MA/LBM_MA_en.pdf> accessed 24 January 2019; European Commission, ‘Morocco:
Fishery products’ (19 December 2017) <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sanco/traces/output/MA/FFP_MA_en.pdf> accessed
31 January 2018; European Commission, ‘Morocco: Processing plants’ (3 August 2017) <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sanco/
traces/output/MA/ABP-FSB_MA_en.pdf> accessed 24 January 2019.
77Joint Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission, Written Questions
E-0001004/11, P-001023/11, E-002315/11 (14 June 2011) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=
P-2011-001023&language=DE> accessed 24 January 2019.
78Case T-512/12 (n 75) para 99.
79Kontorovich (n 47) 604.
80Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco [2006] OJ L 141/4.
81Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial
contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco
[2013] OJ L 328/2 (2013 Fisheries Protocol).
82Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Communities and the Kingdom of Morocco [2006] OJ L 141 (FPA)
arts 1, 12.
83Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries partnership Agreement
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco [2006] OJ L 141/9, art 2.
84FPA, art 2(a) (emphasis added).
85V Chapaux, ‘The Question of the European Community-Morocco Fisheries Agreement’ in K Arts and PP Leite (eds),
International Law and the Question of Western Sahara (International Platform of Jurists for East Timor 2009) 217, 218; E
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were similar in geographical scope and under which EU vessels were authorised by Morocco to operate in
Western Sahara waters.86 Furthermore, while the southernmost geographical limit of the FPA is not clearly
defined, thereby creating doubt as to whether it extends beyond the internationally recognised maritime
boundaries of Morocco,87 the practice of the parties has settled the matter and the Commission itself has
acknowledged that fishing by EU vessels has taken place in the waters off Western Sahara.88 Upon its
expiry, the FPA was not automatically renewed – partly because of doubts regarding its compatibility with
international law.89
Against this background a new Fisheries Protocol was negotiated and signed in 2013. The 2013
Protocol was modelled after its predecessor; it applies to ‘waters falling within the sovereignty or
jurisdiction of Morocco’90 and, according to its provisions, the EU, again, pays a financial contribution to
Morocco for access to its waters91 – including the waters off the coast of Western Sahara. The Commission
has clarified that ‘the Western Sahara waters are included in the new Protocol’.92 It is noteworthy that
several Member States raised serious concerns over the inclusion of Western Sahara in the new Protocol.
Denmark and Sweden voted against the adoption of the Protocol, raising doubt as to whether any economic
gains resulting from its implementation would actually benefit the people of Western Sahara.93 Finland,
the Netherlands and the UK abstained from voting, citing similar concerns.94
Despite some initial hesitation, the Parliament approved the new Protocol in 2013, acting on the
advice of its legal service.95 According to the Opinion rendered by the Parliament’s legal service, Morocco,
as a ‘de facto administering power’, is responsible for the economic development of Western Sahara.96
The legal service claimed that, under international law, de facto administering powers are not prohibited
from undertaking economic activities pertaining to natural resources in non-self-governing territories.97
The Opinion rendered by the Parliament’s legal service was largely based on a 2002 Opinion issued by the
Cannizzaro, ‘A Higher Law for Treaties?’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011)
425, 430.
86Chapaux (n 85) 218; Dawidowicz (n 25) 268.
87Legal Service of the European Parliament, ‘Legal Opinion: Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the
Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco – Compatibility with the
principles of international law’ (20 February 2006) SJ-0085/06, D(2006)7352, paras 31–5.
88Reply from European Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Written Question E-4425/08 (12 September 2008) <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-4425&language=PL> accessed 24 January 2019. Reply from
the European Commission to Oral Question H-0079/09 (12 March 2009) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090312+ANN-01+DOC+XML+V0//EN#top> accessed 24 January 2019. See also Legal Service
of the European Parliament, ‘Legal Opinion: Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the
fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the fisheries Partnership Agreement in force between the two
parties’ (04 November 2013) SJ-0665/13, D(2013)50041, para 29 (2013 Legal Opinion).
89European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2011 on the future Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and
financial compensation provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom
of Morocco, 2011/2949 (RSP) para 9.
90Council Decision of 15 November 2013 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the
European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution paid for in the
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco [2013] OJ L 328/1, point (2).
912013 Fisheries Protocol (n 81) art 3.
92Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-007185/2013 (17 September 2013)
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-007185&language=EN> accessed 24 January 2019.
93Statements by Denmark, Sweden, Proposal for a Council Decision, on the signing on behalf of the European Union, of the
Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution
provided for in the Fisheries Partnership agreement in force between the two parties (14 November 2013) 15723/13, ADD 1, 2, 7
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015723%202013%20ADD%201> accessed 24 January 2019.
94Statements by Finland, the Netherlands and the UK, Proposal for a Council Decision, on the signing on behalf of the
European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities
and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership agreement in force between the two parties (14 November
2013) 15723/13, ADD 1, 5, 7, 8 <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015723%202013%20ADD%201>
accessed 24 January 2019.
95Kontorovich (n 47) 606.
962013 Legal Opinion (n 88) para 17.
97Ibid, para 18.
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UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel,98 Hans Corell (‘Corell Opinion’).99
The UN Security Council requested Corell to issue an Opinion on the legality, under international law,
of certain contracts concluded between Morocco and foreign companies regarding the exploration of
mineral resources in Western Sahara.100 Corell analysed the question from the point of view of the status
of Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory and did not touch upon the status of Morocco as an
occupying power. Having analysed the relevant State and judicial practice, he concluded that mineral
resources activities in a non-self-governing territory are illegal if conducted in disregard of the needs
and interests of the people of that territory.101 On this basis, the Parliament’s legal service concluded
that the Protocol between the EU and Morocco is compatible with international law as long as ‘a certain
amount of the financial contribution [granted by the EU] is allocated by Morocco to the benefit of Western
Sahara population’.102 The conclusion of the 2013 Fisheries Protocol was vociferously denounced by
Front Polisario since it would ‘give a sign of legitimisation to the Moroccan occupation of the Territory,
thus contributing to the prolonging of the suffering of the Sahrawi people’.103
The qualification of the legal status of Western Sahara as a territory ‘de facto administered’ by
Morocco is questionable on a number of grounds. First, the concept of ‘de facto administrative power’
does not correspond to any legal category under international law. In other words, the concept simply
does not exist as a matter of positive law.104 The status of ‘administering power’ is a legal status granted
by the UN and in the absence of such recognition a State cannot proclaim itself to be one.105 The UN still
recognises Spain as the de jure administering power of Western Sahara and Spain has relied on this status
to extend its international jurisdiction in criminal matters to crimes committed in Western Sahara.106
Furthermore, the legal service’s reliance on the Corell Opinion for the purpose of substantiating the claim
that Morocco is the de facto administering power of Western Sahara is not without problems. The Opinion
in question made it abundantly clear that Morocco is not the administering power of Western Sahara and
that this designation was only used by analogy in order to answer the more general question of whether
mineral resource activities in non-self-governing territories by an administering power are illegal.107
In this context, it bears noting that Corell has expressly distanced himself from any attempts to construe
his 2002 Opinion as lending support to the view that, under international law, Morocco is the ‘de facto
administrative power’ of Western Sahara.108
In this light, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that by entering into a number of agreements
with Morocco that have been de facto applied to the territory of Western Sahara, the EU has acted in
breach of its obligation of non-recognition to the extent that it has recognised Morocco’s treaty-making
capacity with respect to Western Sahara and thus, implicitly, the Moroccan claim to sovereignty over the
98Ibid.
99UNSC, ‘Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, Hans Corell,
addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (12 February 2002) UN Doc S/2002/161 (Corell Opinion).
100Ibid, para 1.
101Ibid, paras 21, 24.
1022013 Legal Opinion (n 88) para 31. It bears noting that this was not the first time that the Corell Opinion was cited as
evidence that, under international law, Morocco is allowed to conclude agreements regarding the exploitation of Western Saharan
natural resources. In 2006 Commissioner Borg stated: ‘Regarding the question whether Morocco can conclude agreements
concerning the exploitation of natural resources of the western Sahara, the opinion of the UN legal adviser gives a clear answer
. . . [T]he interpretation given by the UN legal adviser implies that Morocco is a “de facto” administrative power of the territory of
Western Sahara and consequently has the competence to conclude such a type of agreement’; Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf
of the Commission to Written Question E-0560/2006 (15 March 2006) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?
reference=E-2006-0560&language=EN> accessed 24 January 2019.
103M Sidati, ‘Polisario Front: EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement Undermines UN Efforts to Find Solution to Western Sahara
Conflict (statement)’ (Statement to Europe, 10 December 2013) <http://www.sadr-emb-au.net/polisario-front-eu-morocco-
fisheries-agreement-undermines-un-efforts-to-find-solution-to-western-sahara-conflict-statement/> accessed 24 January 2019.
104Chapaux (n 85) 223.
105Arts 73 and 74 of the UN Charter. Chapaux (n 85) 222.
106See the decision by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional (National High Court): Summario1/2015, 9 April 2015 <http://www.
rightsinternationalspain.org/uploads/noticia/37c008565d943d77468c0f275052d37b25ca7bcb.pdf> accessed 24 January 2019.
107Corell Opinion (n 99) paras 7–8.
108H Corell, ‘The Principle of Sovereignty of Natural Resources and Its Consequences’ in M Balboni and G Laschi (eds),
The European Union’s Approach to Western Sahara (PIE Peter Lang 2017) 129, 131.
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territory.109 It is instructive that a number of other third-party States have publicly declared that their
free trade agreements with Morocco do not extend to Western Sahara exactly because Morocco does not
exercise internationally recognised sovereignty over the territory. The Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs has stated that the free trade agreement between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
States and Morocco is not applicable to Western Sahara since Western Sahara is not part of Morocco’s
territory.110 In a similar vein, the US has interpreted its free trade agreement with Morocco as not covering
Western Sahara since ‘the United States and many other countries do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty
over Western Sahara’.111 Furthermore, the fact that Morocco is not the administering power of Western
Sahara and thus cannot conclude agreements extending to the territory in that capacity, raises questions
regarding the legal basis that would justify Morocco’s treaty-making capacity over Western Sahara.
Against this background, the next section endeavours to explore how the ECJ treated the question
of the territorial scope of the Association and Liberalisation Agreements in the context of the Front
Polisario case.
4.2. The ECJ and the territorial scope of the EU-Morocco Association and Liberalisation Agreements:
the Front Polisario judgment
On 21 December 2016 the ECJ delivered its appeal judgment in the Front Polisario case.112
The Grand Chamber overturned the General Court’s judgment and decided that Front Polisario did
not have legal standing to bring an action for annulment against the Council Decision adopting the
Liberalisation Agreement since, in its view, neither the Liberalisation Agreement nor the EU-Morocco
Association Agreement legally extended to the territory of Western Sahara.113 The ECJ ruled that the
General Court erred in interpreting the territorial scope of the Liberalisation Agreement as extending to
Western Sahara to the extent that it failed to take into account Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),114 pursuant to which the interpretation of a treaty must be carried out
in the light of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.115
The Court pointed out three relevant rules of applicable international law that the General Court failed
to take into account: the right to self-determination; Article 29 VCLT relating to the territorial scope
of international agreements; and the principle of the relative effect of treaties (the principle of pacta
tertiis).116 By having recourse to the legal context of the dispute, the Court concluded that the territorial
scope of the EU-Morocco Agreements did not include Western Sahara.
The ECJ’s approach to treaty interpretation in Front Polisario has been criticised in the literature
mainly because of the ECJ’s artificial and selective reliance on international law.117 According to
Odermatt, the judgment is an example of the Court ‘instrumentalizing’ international law.118 First, the
109Dawidowicz (n 25) 274. S Koury, ‘The European Community and Member States’ Duty of Non-Recognition under the
EC-Morocco Association Agreement: State Responsibility and Customary International Law’ in Arts and Leite (n 85) 165,
187–90; Chapaux (n 85) 233–4; Cannizzaro (n 85) 430.
110See the reply given by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Jonas Gahr Store, to a parliamentary question:
‘Norway: No way for Western Sahara free trade’ (WSRW, 12 May 2010) <http://www.wsrw.org/a105x1411> accessed 24 January
2019; for the position of Switzerland in relation to the EFTA-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, see the opinion of the Swiss
Federal Council: ‘Obligation de déclarer les marchandises provenant des territoires du Sahara occidental occupés par le Maroc’
(The Federal Assembly – The Swiss Parliament, 15 May 2013) <https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/
geschaeft?AffairId=20133178> accessed 24 January 2019.
111See R Zoellick, ‘Letter from the U.S. Trade Representative R. Zoellick to Rep. J. Pitts’ (22 July 2004) 150 Cong. Rec. H667.
112Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro
(Front Polisario) ECLI:EU:C:2016:973.
113Ibid, paras 92, 123, 132, 133.
114Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) (VCLT) 1155
UNTS 331.
115Case C-104/16 P (n 112) para 86.
116Ibid, para 87.
117See generally E Kassoti, ‘The Council v. Front Polisario Case: The Court of Justice’s Selective Reliance on Treaty
Interpretation’ (2017) 2 European Papers 23; J Odermatt, ‘Council of the European Union v. Front populaire pour la libération
de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario). Case C-104/16P’ (2017) 111 AJIL 731; P Hilpold, ‘Self-determination
at the European Courts: The Front Polisario Case or the Unintended Awakening of a Giant’ (2017) 2 European Papers 907.
118Odermatt (n 117) 737.
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ECJ approached the question of interpretation of the territorial scope of the Association Agreement and,
by extension, that of the Liberalisation Agreement, largely through the lens of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.
However, The Court’s excessive reliance on Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the fact that it paid little to no
attention to other elements contained therein go against the interpretative process envisaged thereunder; a
process that is predicated on the combined application of all means of interpretation set out in Article
31.119 This not only shows the Court’s unfamiliarity with the operation of Article 31 VCLT,120 but it
is also hardly reconcilable with the aim of treaty interpretation in general.121 Thus, the excessive focus
placed on Article 31(3)(c) VCLT transformed the interpretive process from a quest to establish objectively
the intention of the parties to a quest for the ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties’. More importantly, the Court’s approach calls into question the very outcome of
this process.
Secondly, the Court’s findings are premised on the assumption that the legal status of
non-self-governing territories (as entities separate and distinct from the States administering them)
also implies that these entities enjoy some form of territorial sovereignty or title over territory; any
other inference would run counter to the overall conclusion of legal inapplicability of the Association
Agreement to the territory of Western Sahara. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration’s122 reference
to the ‘distinct and separate status’ of non-self-governing territories is generally understood to mean that
these territories enjoy a separate legal status, that is, a measure of international legal personality, and not
necessarily some form of territorial sovereignty.123 Overall, neither Chapter XI of the UN Charter (dealing
with non-self-governing territories) nor the Friendly Relations Declaration address matters of territorial
title as such, as their focus lies with the development of these territories and the people concerned.124
The question of territorial sovereignty over non-self-governing territories remains a controversial one
and there is evidence to suggest that sovereignty remains with the administering State.125 The ICJ dealt
with the question of sovereignty over non-self-governing territories in the Right of Passage case and
it clearly accepted that the administering power retained sovereignty over the territory in question.126
Furthermore, in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, the Court clarified that the request, pertaining
to the future status of the non-self-governing territory in question, did not relate to ‘existing territorial
rights or sovereignty over the territory’.127 In the light of the indeterminacy surrounding questions of
territorial sovereignty over non-self-governing territories, it is submitted that more by way of evidence
should have been furnished by the Court in order to support the proposition that these entities enjoy a
separate territorial status.
Furthermore, the Court’s finding to the effect that Article 29 VCLT creates a presumption against
extraterritoriality is questionable and it does not comport with the drafting history of the Article. The ILC,
in its commentary on the relevant Article, made it abundantly clear that the matter of extraterritorial
application of treaties was too complicated and it decided to leave it aside.128 Accordingly, it is widely
acknowledged that Article 29 VCLT does not create a presumption either in favour of or against the
extraterritorial application of a treaty as the matter simply does not fall under the scope of the Article.129
119ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries’ (adopted by the ILC at its 18th session’ (1966) II Yrbk of
the ILC 219, para 8. See also R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 31–2.
120According to Gardiner, in its interpretive practice pertaining to international agreements concluded with non-Member States,
the ECJ ‘has not overtly progressed beyond the first paragraph of article 31 of the Vienna Convention’ Gardiner (n 119) 138.
121Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) [2009] ICJ Rep 213, para 48.
122Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 25/2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.
123Crawford (n 43) 618–19.
124Ibid, 613.
125Ibid. See also A Schwed, ‘Territorial Claims as a Limitation to the Right of Self-determination in the Context of the Falkland
Islands Dispute’ (1982) 6 Fordham Int’l LJ 443. Cf I Lukashuk, ‘Parties to Treaties – The Right to Participation’ (1972) 135
RdC 231, 254–5.
126Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) [1960] ICJ Rep 6, 39.
127Western Sahara (n 12) para 43.
128Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries (n 119) 213–14, para 5.
129S Karagiannis, ‘The Territorial Application of Treaties’ in D Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to the Law of Treaties (OUP
2012) 305, 318; K Odendahl, ‘Article 29’ in O Dörr and K Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A
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In this light, the Court’s conclusion that Article 29 VCLT ‘precluded Western Sahara from being regarded
as coming within the territorial scope of the Association Agreement’130 seems unsubstantiated.
The Court’s interpretation and application of the pacta tertiis principle is also noteworthy. Here,
the Court considered the peoples of Western Sahara as a ‘third party’,131 thereby extending the pacta
tertiis rule to non-State actors, as it had done before in Brita.132 However, there are grounds to question
the applicability of the principle to non-self-governing territories. The pacta tertiis rule expresses ‘the
fundamental principle that a treaty applies only between the parties to it’;133 and thus, treaties to which a
State is not a party are generally considered as res inter alios acta – a matter between others. The raison
d’être of the principle is to ensure that States should not be bound against their will,134 something that
would run counter to two core tenets of international law, namely sovereignty and sovereign equality.135
Thus, in international law, the principle is viewed as ‘a corollary of the principles of sovereignty, equality
and independence of States’.136 Relevant legal literature suggests that the rule’s conceptual roots in
the notions of State sovereignty and sovereign equality preclude its application to State–non-State actor
relationships.137 State practice also supports the proposition that there are exceptions to the pacta tertiis
rule vis-à-vis non-State actors. States may create entities with legal personality by means of a treaty and
subject them to international obligations. International organisations are a case in point. These actors,
while possessing legal personality, are third parties in relation to their constitutive treaties and they may
incur obligations (among other things by means of their constitutive treaties) even absent their consent.138
In this light, the Court’s unqualified assertion that the pacta tertiis rule applies in casu seems to rest on
thin evidentiary grounds.139
Finally, the overwhelming majority of commentators have found problematic the Court’s reluctance
to engage extensively with the parties’ ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty’ under Article
31(3)(b) VCLT for the purpose of interpreting the territorial scope of the Association and Liberalisation
Agreements.140 The importance attached to the subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty in its
interpretation constitutes one of the most distinctive features of the Vienna rules.141 According to the ILC,
‘the importance of such subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as an element of interpretation,
is obvious; for it constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the
treaty’.142 Treaty terms are given meaning by action and thus, the subsequent practice of the parties is
the best evidence of their intention.143 International adjudicatory bodies routinely have recourse to the
subsequent practice of the parties in interpreting treaty terms.144
The Court’s approach to the element of ‘subsequent practice’ of the parties in the Front Polisario
judgment does not reflect the importance attached thereto in international jurisprudence. Here, the Court
did not take into account this element in establishing the ordinary meaning of the term ‘territory of the
Commentary (Springer 2012) 489, 502; M Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles
and Policy (OUP 2011) 11.
130Case C-104/16 P (n 112) para 97.
131Ibid, para 106.
132Case C-386/08 (n 67) para 52.
133J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 384.
134The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey), PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, para 44.
135A MacNair, The Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1961) 35.
136M Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 467.
137D Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Hart Publishing 2016) 94–105; S Sivakumaran, ‘Binding Armed
Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 319, 377–8.
138D Murray, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups’ (2014) 20 JCSL 101, 118; C
Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (Clarendon Press 1993) 12.
139Odermatt (n 117) 736.
140E Cannizzaro, ‘In Defence of Front Polisario: The ECJ as a Global Jus Cogens Maker’ (2018) 55 CML Rev 569, 578;
Kassoti (n 117) 37–40; Odermatt (n 117) 737; Hilpold (n 117) 917.
141Gardiner (n 119) 253.
142Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries (n 119) 221, para 15 (emphasis added).
143Gardiner (n 119) 253.
144See e.g. Case concerning Kasikili/Seduku Island (Botswana v Namibia) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para 50; WTO, Japan: Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages II (4 October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R, 12–13.
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Kingdom of Morocco’, nor did it test the result of its initial textual interpretation against the background
of this element in order to confirm its veracity. In a similar vein, the Court’s dismissal of subsequent
conduct by the EU and Morocco as mere de facto instances of application of the Agreements at hand
to the territory of Western Sahara145 is less than convincing since the Court failed to explain why these
instances do not constitute subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT.
Overall, the Court’s reliance on international law in the context of the Front Polisario judgment
seems artificial and selective. In an obvious attempt to evade a politically sensitive issue,146 the Court used
selectively international rules on treaty interpretation to limit the legal applicability of the EU-Morocco
Agreements to the latter’s territory, while stopping short of addressing the de facto application of the
Agreements to Western Sahara.147 The fact that the Court reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to
self-determination does not diminish the essentially political nature of the judgment. By circumventing
the thorny question of the factual application of the Agreements to Western Sahara, the Court effectively
turned a blind eye to the EU’s actual practice on the ground. It is quite telling that although the Court
mentioned the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, it failed to make any reference to the
concomitant obligation of non-recognition incumbent upon the EU by virtue of international law. Thus,
ultimately, the Front Polisario judgment lends evidentiary force to critical voices in the literature that have
cast doubt on the image of the EU, as evidenced by the jurisprudence of its principal judicial organ, as an
actor maintaining a distinctive commitment to international law.148
The Court’s line of reasoning in Front Polisario is not merely of academic interest but has important
practical ramifications for the EU’s approach to the territory – especially in the light of the newly
adopted Council Decision amending Protocols 1 and 4 to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement.149
The Decision in question purports to expressly extend the territorial scope of the EU-Morocco Association
Agreement to Western Sahara.150 The Court’s failure to address the broader international legal framework
of the dispute, and more fundamentally, the EU’s duty of non-recognition, has (at least to a large degree)
allowed the Council and the Commission to claim that the express extension of the Agreement to Western
Sahara does not imply recognition of Moroccan ‘sovereignty over Western Sahara’.151 However, as shown
above, the duty of non-recognition expressly requires third parties to abstain from entering into treaty
relations with the non-recognised regime in respect of the unlawfully acquired territory. Thus, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that by extending the territorial scope of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement
145Case C-104/16 P (n 112) para 121.
146The political overtones of the judgment were highlighted by the Council and the Commission, which argued that ‘the
political nature of the questions raised by the present case would lead the Court to make political rather than legal assessments’.
Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front populaire pour la libération
de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) ECLI:EU:C:2016:677, para 141. According to Odermatt: ‘the [Western
Sahara] cases clearly have political consequences for EU-Morocco relations, as evidenced by the strong response by Morocco to
the judgments’; J Odermatt, ‘Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International Courts’ (2018) 14 Int JLC 221, 230.
147The same argument is made by S Hummelbrunner and A-C Prickarz, ‘EU-Morocco Trade Relations Do Not
Legally Affect Western Sahara – Case C-104/16 P Council v Front Polisario’ (European Law Blog, 5 January
2017) <http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/01/05/eu-morocco-trade-relations-do-not-legally-affect-western-sahara-case-c-10416-
p-council-v-front-polisario/> accessed 24 January 2019.
148J Klabbers, The European Union in International Law (A Pedone 2012) 77. See also generally G de Búrca, ‘The European
Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’ (2010) 51 Harvard ILJ 1, 5.
149Council Decision regarding the signature, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange
of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the
one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, Council Doc 10591/18, 10 July 2018.
150Ibid, 2. See also Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision regarding the signature, on behalf of the European Union,
of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the
amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, 11 June 2018, SWD(2018)
346 final, point 1.
151Council Decision (n 149) 5, point 10. See also Proposal for a Council Decision regarding the signature, on behalf of the
European Union, of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of
Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, 11 June 2018,
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to expressly include Western Sahara, the EU falls foul of its international law duty of non-recognition –
despite the claim that such extension does not imply the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the
territory. This illustrates the practical importance of the Court’s line of argumentation in Front Polisario.
Had the Court expressly pronounced on the incompatibility of the application of the Agreement to Western
Sahara with the EU’s duty of non-recognition, little room would have been left to the political institutions
to pursue the express extension of the Agreement to Western Sahara.
4.3. The ECJ and the territorial scope of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement and the
2013 Fisheries Protocol: the Western Sahara Campaign UK judgment
In Western Sahara Campaign UK, the Court was faced with the question of the territorial scope of
the FPA and the 2013 Fisheries Protocol.152 The EU’s duty of non-recognition featured prominently both
in the applicant’s submissions and in the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Wathelet. According to
the applicant, the inclusion of that territory and of the waters off the coast of Western Sahara within the
territorial scope of the relevant EU-Morocco Agreements violates Article 3(5) TEU to the extent that such
inclusion is incompatible with a number of international law duties incumbent upon the EU, including the
duty of non-recognition.153 For his part, the Advocate General, having ascertained that the agreements at
bar cover Western Sahara,154 opined that the inclusion of Western Sahara in the territorial scope of the
EU-Morocco fisheries agreements constitutes a breach of the EU’s duty of non-recognition to the extent
that this inclusion constitutes recognition of Morocco’s treaty-making capacity – and thus, implicitly,
Moroccan sovereignty – over the territory.155
However, the Court disagreed with this view and concluded that, as a matter of law, the agreements
in question do not apply to the territory of Western Sahara and the waters adjacent thereto.156 In doing so,
the Court closely followed the reasoning applied in Front Polisario and relied heavily on the normative
context of the dispute (Article 31(3)(c) VCLT) in order to buttress its finding of inapplicability of the
agreements to Western Sahara.157 In a similar vein to Front Polisario, the Court’s approach to treaty
interpretation in this case is open to criticism.158 In both cases the Court relied selectively on international
law rules, thereby managing to seemingly achieve conformity with international law without having to
pronounce on the legal repercussions of the EU’s policy and practice towards Western Sahara.159
One aspect of the judgment which is strongly reminiscent of the approach to treaty interpretation
espoused in Front Polisario is the Court’s exclusive reliance on Article 31(3)(c) VCLT for the purpose
of interpreting the term ‘waters falling within the jurisdiction’ of Morocco.160 Here, the Court relied
exclusively on Articles 55 and 56 UNCLOS161 in order to interpret the territorial clause of the FPA
and did not engage at all with the other means of interpretation listed in Article 31 VCLT. The Court’s
excessive reliance on Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the fact that it did not take into account the other means
of interpretation contained in the Article significantly depart from the letter and spirit of the Vienna rules,
which – as seen above – envisage interpretation as a holistic process.
152Case C-266/16 The Queen on the application of Western Sahara Campaign UK v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs, Secretary of State for Food and Rural Affairs EU:C:2018:18.
153Ibid, para 32. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-266/16 The Queen on the application of Western Sahara
Campaign UK v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Secretary of State for Food and Rural Affairs
EU:C:2018:1, para 26.
154Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet (n 153) paras 60–75.
155Ibid, paras 187–213.
156Case C-266/16 (n 152) para 85.
157Ibid, paras 57–85.
158For a detailed discussion, see E Kassoti, ‘The ECJ and the Art of Treaty Interpretation: Western Sahara Campaign UK’
(2019) 56 CML Rev 209; J Odermatt, ‘Fishing in Troubled Waters: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-266/16 R (on the application
of Western Sahara Campaign UK) v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Secretary of State for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs’ (2018) 14 EuConst 751.
159Odermatt (n 117) 737–8.
160Case C-266/16 (n 152) paras 65–73.
161United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994)
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Furthermore, as shown above, the majority of commentators have found the Court’s reluctance to
engage extensively with the parties’ subsequent practice according to Article 31(3)(b) VCLT particularly
problematic in the context of the Front Polisario case. The same reluctance to engage with the parties’
subsequent practice for the purpose of interpreting the territorial scope of the FPA and the 2013 Protocol
permeates the Court’s judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK. More particularly, the Court’s failure
to address the element of the subsequent practice of the parties – even though both the Council and the
Commission expressly acknowledged that the agreements in question are applicable to Western Sahara162
– severely undermines the outcome of its interpretative process.163
Furthermore, as with Front Polisario, the judgment has significant practical consequences for the
EU’s future approach towards the territory – especially in the light of the ongoing negotiations for a new
fisheries agreement with Morocco. In particular, the Commission is currently negotiating a Sustainable
Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco which is expressly intended to cover the waters off the
coast of Western Sahara.164 According to the relevant Commission proposal issued in October 2018,
although the Court in the Western Sahara Campaign UK case concluded that the current Agreement does
not extend to Western Sahara ‘in view of the considerations set out in the Court’s judgment . . . it was
nonetheless possible to include that territory and the waters adjacent thereto in the [Sustainable] Fisheries
Partnership [Agreement] . . . ’.165
The Commission’s invocation of the Court’s argumentation in Western Sahara Campaign UK in order
to justify the express inclusion of the territory in the new fisheries agreement with Morocco illustrates
the practical importance thereof. Had the Court applied the rules of treaty interpretation as these are
understood and applied in international judicial practice, it would have reached the same conclusion as
Advocate General Wathelet, namely that the application of the fisheries agreements to Western Sahara
violates a number of duties incumbent upon the EU on the basis of international law, including the duty of
non-recognition. Thus, the Court’s ‘instrumentalization’ of international law in Western Sahara Campaign
UK has allowed the institutions to continue their ‘realpolitik’ approach166 towards Western Sahara as
evidenced by the aforementioned Commission proposal.
5. Conclusion
The article has shown that the EU’s trade practice in relation to unlawfully acquired territories
does not comport with the image of the EU as an internationally engaged polity committed to the strict
observance and development of international law. The case-studies of the occupied Palestinian territories
and Western Sahara illustrate that the EU and its courts have systematically ignored the international
law duty of non-recognition in carving out the legal relationship between the EU and these territories.
The failure to take into account the international legal status of the territories vindicates the view that ‘the
story of the EU and international law as a happy family, is a seductive story, but it does have a few holes
in its plot . . . [C]loser scrutiny reveals that the openness narrative is not supported by practice, in particular
the practice of the courts.’167
In this respect, the CJEU’s selective reliance on international law in the Western Sahara cases is
particularly disappointing. In both judgments the Court’s unilateral re-interpretation of international
law was clearly geared towards shielding the EU from the legal consequences stemming from its policy
towards Western Sahara.168 At the very minimum, this line of case-law should raise a few eyebrows as to
162Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet (n 153) para 144.
163Kassoti (n 158) 225–9. Odermatt (n 158) 759–60.
164European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Sustainable Fisheries
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the Implementation Protocol thereto and an
exchange of letters accompanying the said Agreement, COM (2018) 677 final, 8 October 2018 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0677> accessed 24 January 2019.
165Ibid, 2.
166Crawford (n 27) para 131.
167J Klabbers, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit? International Law and the EU Legal Order’ in P. Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign
Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 95, 97.
168Odermatt (n 146) 230
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the extent to which the Court performed its judicial function in a proper manner. On the international
plane, few disputes have no political ramifications. As the ICJ put it:
[T]he fact that a legal question also has political aspects, ‘as, in the nature of things, is the case with
so many questions which arise in international life’, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a
‘legal question’ and to ‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute
. . . ’ Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question
which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial function . . . 169
Displaying a cavalier attitude towards international law in politically sensitive cases not only threatens
the Court’s own legitimacy, but also undermines ‘respect for international law’ as a core constitutional
value of the EU – thereby undermining the image of the EU as a global actor with a particular fidelity to
international law.170
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